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Scientific and Pragmatic Challenges
for Bridging Education and Neuroscience

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Abstract

Educational neuroscience is an emerging effort to integrate neuroscience methods, particularly functional neuroimaging, with behavioral methods to address issues of learning and instruction. It can be difficult for researchers to evaluate the promise of educational neuroscience due to a lack of cross-disciplinary knowledge. To aid in that evaluation, this paper consolidates common concerns with connecting education and neuroscience. One set of concerns is scientific: it includes in-principle differences in methods, data, theory, and philosophy. The other set of concerns is pragmatic and comprises practical considerations of cost, timing, locus of control, and likely payoffs. We first articulate the concerns and then revisit them, re-interpreting them as potential opportunities. In addition to presenting both sides of the debate, we also provide instances of neuroscience findings and methods that are relevant to education. Our goal is to offer educational researchers a window into contemporary neuroscience so they can begin to think more specifically about the prospects of educational neuroscience.
Neuroscience has experienced rapid growth in recent years, spurred in part by the federal government’s designation of the 1990s as “the decade of the brain” (Jones & Mendell, 1999). The rapid development of functional neuroimaging techniques has given researchers unprecedented access to the behaving brains of healthy children and adults. The result has been a wave of new insights into thinking, emotion, motivation, learning, and development. These insights are suffusing the social sciences, and in some cases, they are causing a reconsideration of existing explanations. This is most true of psychology, as marked by the births of cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Gazzaniga et al., 2002), developmental neuroscience (e.g., Johnson et al., 2001), and social neuroscience (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2005). It is increasingly true of economics, where the rapid rise of neuroeconomics (e.g., Camerer et al., 2005) has caught the attention of the popular press (e.g., Cassidy, 2006). Other social sciences, including communication (e.g., Anderson et al., 2006), political science (e.g., McDermott, 2004), and sociology (e.g., Wexler, 2006) are just beginning to confront the question of whether their research can be informed by neuroscience.

Education is somewhere between the two poles of early adopters and tentative newcomers. A decade ago, in this journal, Bruer (1997) forcefully considered the relevance of neuroscience to education. His conclusion – that neuroscience is “a bridge too far” – was noteworthy because Bruer was then director of the McDonnell Foundation, which was actively funding research in
both disciplines. Though it was in his best interests to find connections between the disciplines, he found instead poorly drawn extrapolations that inflated neuroscience findings into educational neuromyths. Since Bruer’s cautionary evaluation, a number of commentators have considered the prospects for educational neuroscience. Many of them have sounded a more optimistic note (Ansari & Coch, 2006; Byrnes & Fox, 1998; Geake & Cooper, 2003; Goswami, 2006; Petitto & Dunbar, in press), and a textbook has even appeared (Blakemore & Frith, 2005).

In this paper, we negotiate the middle ground between the pessimism of Bruer and the optimism of those who followed. Table 1 summarizes eight concerns about connecting education and neuroscience. Some are drawn from Bruer (1997) and the ensuing commentaries. Others come from conversations with colleagues in both disciplines, and still others from our own experiences. These concerns do not seem to represent a blanket dismissal, but rather a genuine curiosity (tempered by a healthy skepticism) about the implications of neuroscience for education. We begin by articulating the concerns along with some facts about neuroscience that make the concerns more concrete. We voice them in the strong tone in which we have heard them espoused. We then revisit the concerns, re-interpreting them as potential opportunities (also in Table 1). This permits us to review a selection of neuroscience studies relevant to content learning. We focus on recent functional neuroimaging (fMRI) studies for reasons
of space, and because these are the findings that have captured the most attention, both in the academy and the popular press. Ideally, our review illustrates some elements of neuroscience so that educational researchers can think more specifically about the prospects of educational neuroscience.

We conclude with two reflections on moving from armchair arguments of a philosophical nature to scientific action on the ground. First, we argue that education and neuroscience can be bridged if (and only if) researchers collaborate across disciplinary lines on tractable problems of common interest. It is the success or failure of these collaborations, and not logical arguments for or against connecting the two disciplines, that will ultimately determine the fate of educational neuroscience. Second, we argue for a cautious optimism. Neuroscience cannot replace education, nor is that the goal of educational neuroscience. There are limitations on what neuroscience can tell us about the social and contextual matrix that is powerful in learning. If educational researchers are not mindful of these limitations – if they buy into the hard sell – they will find themselves disappointed by the scope and pace of progress. If, on the other hand, they understand the limitations of neuroscience methods and employ them in a complementary manner, then there is reason to be optimistic about the future prospects of educational neuroscience.

Concerns with Connecting Education and Neuroscience
We are not the first to notice that education and neuroscience are quite different disciplines, and it is unclear whether they can inform each other. In this section, we distill their primary differences into eight concerns about connecting education and neuroscience. These concerns come in two clusters – scientific and pragmatic.

*Scientific Concerns*

The first cluster addresses the scientific distance between education and neuroscience. Do their different methods, different data, and different theories constitute a fundamentally unbridgeable divide?

*(1) Methods: Neuroscience methods do not provide access to important educational considerations such as context.* The methods of a science constrain and circumscribe its data and theories. Neuroscience methods demand highly artificial contexts, and thus cannot provide useful data or theories about classroom contexts.

The application of neuroscience methods to social science research questions has increased dramatically with the development of new methods for non-invasively measuring brain activity in behaving humans. One branch of neuroscience, neuropsychology, has historically had an important relation to education, particularly with respect to behavioral assessments of potential neural problems including ADHD, fetal alcohol syndrome, and early exposure to neurotoxins (see D’Amato, Fletcher-Janzen, & Reynolds, 2005). The new
instruments of neuroscience allow researchers to examine brain function directly, rather than inferring brain function from behavioral assessments. These tools enable a better understanding of normally and abnormally functioning brains. However, the new methods have limitations compared to neuropsychology. Most notably, they do not permit assessment in the field, for example by a school psychologist.

Different functional neuroimaging methods have relative strengths and weaknesses. The temporal resolution of a method is how well it can measure rapid changes in brain activity. The spatial resolution is how precisely it can localize the source of this activity. Event-related potentials (ERPs) and functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) provide a good example of how temporal and spatial resolution trade off in current methods. Electrodes on the scalp can measure ERPs – changes in the brain’s electrical activity time-locked to external events such as stimulus presentation. ERPs give precise temporal resolution, on the order of milliseconds. However, ERPs have poor spatial resolution, licensing only coarse inferences about location. By contrast, fMRI provides good spatial resolution, on the order of millimeters. However, its temporal resolution is poor: brain activity can only be measured every few seconds. Although we will draw our examples primarily from fMRI studies, it is important to remember that this method, like all neuroscience methods, has limitations, and these limitations constrain the kinds of research questions that can be answered. (For a discussion of the trade-offs among
neuroscience methods, see Gazzaniga et al., 2002.) For this reason, most research questions in neuroscience are addressed using multiple methods, sometimes in the same study.

A shared limitation of most brain recording methods is their obtrusiveness and dependence on highly controlled environments. In fMRI experiments, participants must lie perfectly still inside cramped cylindrical magnets. The scanner is extremely noisy. These constraints make it challenging to run studies with young children. In most fMRI paradigms, participants view stimuli projected on a small hanging mirror, because metal objects can be deadly in the powerful magnetic field. The magnetic fields do not directly measure neural activity; instead, they detect changes in blood flow as the vascular system replenishes nerve cells a few seconds after increased neural activity (i.e., the hemodynamic response). People’s responses are typically limited to pressing buttons. Verbal responses are often avoided because they are difficult to record in the noisy environment and because jaw movement can cause “artifacts” (i.e., distortions that render images uninterpretable).

The brain is a busy place, with all regions requiring blood at all times. To obtain a task-relevant signal that rises statistically above the background noise, participants must perform a task for very many trials. (It is not possible to reliably measure the brain response to a single event, such as a moment of singular insight.) Participants also need to perform a control task many times. The brain
location of task-relevant activation is typically identified by subtracting away
task-irrelevant activation as measured by the control task. For example,
researchers interested in the neural correlates of magnitude comparison might
employ the following experimental and control tasks. In the experimental task,
participants might repeatedly judge whether digits shown one at a time are greater
or smaller than the digit ‘5’. In the control task, they might passively view digits
shown one at a time, but without making a comparison to ‘5’. By subtracting the
activation for passive viewing from the activation for active comparison, the
common activation due to processing the symbolic forms of digits can be
removed, leaving only the activation unique to magnitude comparison.

The context of interest for neuroscientists is the brain, and the limited
environment of the scanner is usually sufficient for triggering measurable changes
in brain context. By contrast, for the educator the relevant context is the mind and
its environment. Thought and learning are profoundly determined by the broader
ccontext, and this is important because educators can orchestrate contexts to
enhance learning. Unfortunately, interesting educational contexts seem beyond
the reach of current neuroscience methods. Good teaching, for example, involves
affecting highly variable contexts rather than presenting a simplified stimulus set.
The norms that regulate classroom interaction do not seem describable as patterns
of activation. To take one example, many mathematics educators believe that
children should apprentice in mathematical cultures to master their symbol
systems and modes of thinking (e.g., Cobb & Yackel, 1996). Contrast this with the methods of neuroscience, which involve hundreds of trials processing nearly identical stimuli. If neuroscience insinuates itself in education, we may be restricted to views of instructional activities that conform to the limitations of neuroscience methods. We may lose access to the contextual variables and interactions that most impact educational practice.

De-emphasizing contextual variables would not be a surprising outcome of an educational neuroscience. The strengths and weaknesses of fMRI match the goals of neuroscience, which include documenting neural mechanisms but not the effects of context on learning or assessment. On questions of context, neuroscience might simply be silent. Moreover, neuroscience is a biological science, and it will naturally gravitate towards biological solutions to learning problems rather than instructional ones.

(2) Data: Localizing different aspects of cognition to different brain networks does not inform educational practice. An important goal of neuroscience is to decompose cognition into primitive functions and to identify neural correlates of these functions. Neuroscientists collect data on the brain areas that selectively activate during language comprehension, mathematical problem solving, and other forms of cognition. However, knowing the location of a primitive cognitive function tells us nothing about how to design instruction for teaching that function, just as knowing where the alternator resides in an engine
tells us nothing about how to teach driving. Does it really matter for reading education whether phonology is processed by the Broca’s area, Wernicke’s area, angular gyrus, or fusiform gyrus?

One might argue that mapping the brain will eventually support useful theories of complex cognition and instruction. The history of behaviorism provides a cautionary parallel. Although behaviorism is not about localization, it similarly espouses a commitment to a specific class of data. Early behaviorism was about discovering how reinforcement affects behavior, often using animals as subjects. It was argued that once these empirical relations were sufficiently understood, it would be possible to scale up behaviorist theories to explain more complex forms of learning such as language acquisition (e.g., Skinner, 1957). However, it has proven quite difficult to build up from data about reinforcement learning, for example, to a satisfactory theory of language acquisition (e.g., Chomsky, 1959). So too, it will be difficult to scale up from data about brain location to explain levels of cognition that educators care about.

(3) Theories: Reductionism is inappropriate. Every science evolves an appropriate vocabulary that supports meaningful generalizations within the domain of study while avoiding irrelevant distinctions. The vocabulary of education supports the description of learning as it occurs inside and outside of classrooms. Neuroscience is a lower-level science than education, and its vocabulary is therefore too microscopic to support useful generalizations for
education. Educational terms of proven value at the level of behavior and practice would be replaced by clusters of neuroscience terms specifying neurotransmitters, cell types, brain areas, genetics, and so forth. The result would be too cumbersome to be a useful description of classroom learning.

A useful analogy is the reduction of mathematics to logic, which Whitehead and Russell (1910; 1912; 1913) attempted in their three-volume Principia Mathematica. The proof of 1+1=2, a statement understood by young children, does not occur until p. 379 of the second volume, where it requires half a page of logical symbols. Mathematicians would have inherited an accounting nightmare if they had switched to the finer-grain vocabulary of logic, and so they did not. Analogously, educational researchers would gain nothing from translating their theories to the terminology of neuroscience.

Even if the vocabulary of education could be comfortably reduced to that of neuroscience, the result would be of no practical significance. What is the value of substituting a neuroscience description of a phenomenon for its educational equivalent (Byrnes & Fox, 1998)? For example, consider a child who is having difficulty determining the larger of two numbers. An educational researcher might describe this as a difficulty in comparing the cardinal values of number symbols. Nothing is gained by re-describing it as a dysfunction of intraparietal sulcus.

(4) Philosophy: Education and neuroscience are incommensurable. The
differences in the vocabularies of education and neuroscience might ultimately be too great to allow multidisciplinary theorizing. The vocabulary of education belongs to the social sciences and includes mental terms such as “understanding” and “identity.” It is tailored for the description of behavioral phenomena – both psychological and social. By contrast, the vocabulary of neuroscience belongs to the biological sciences. It includes material terms such as “hemodynamic response” and “white matter tract.” It is tailored for the description of physical phenomena. These differences are problematic. Cartesian dualism might preclude any reconciliation between the mental terms of education and the material terms of neuroscience (Byrnes & Fox, 1998). Even if reconciliation is possible, for example through some sort of correlation between mental and material terms, problems remain. Durkheim claimed that, “The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness” (1950, p. 110). If he is right, then explaining classroom causality by referring to physical mechanisms is simply an error.

Pragmatic Concerns

Even if the scientific gulf between education and neuroscience can be bridged in principle, it may be too difficult in practice. The pragmatic difficulties that face educational neuroscience can be distilled into four concerns.

(5) Costs: Neuroscience methods are too expensive to address educational research questions. We cannot simply ask about the expected benefits of
educationally relevant neuroscience studies; we must also ask about the associated costs. It costs roughly $600 per participant hour to conduct an fMRI experiment. Most fMRI studies use an affiliated hospital’s scanner and their mandatory support staff, and many participants are run late at night when the scanner is not being used for clinical purposes. Compare this infrastructure cost with the $10 paid to a participant for one hour in a conventional laboratory experiment, or the $0 paid to students in a classroom experiment. A cost-benefit analysis does not support spending orders of magnitude more money for each neuroscience data point given the expected scientific benefit.

Even if this money were spent, and the resulting studies produced relevant insights, the cost of widespread deployment looms. It is fiscally incomprehensible to scale up neuroscience methods to test, sort, and track large populations of students.

(6) Timing: We do not currently know enough about the brain to inform education. Although neuroscience is a discipline with a long history, only recent and on-going technical developments have enabled the non-invasive study of normal brains engaged in complex cognition. The fruits of these technical developments have been nothing short of astounding. Figure 1 indicates the linear increase in new fMRI studies published each year since Bruer’s 1997 paper. The cumulative number of fMRI studies is increasing quadratically, and this excludes other techniques such as ERPs, magnetoencephalography (MEG), and positron
emission tomography (PET). It remains for neuroscientists to digest this mass of findings and deliver theories of brain function at an appropriate level for application to education.

Thus far, the bulk of fMRI studies have not been especially informative for education. Although elegant, they use relatively simple tasks from a behavioral perspective (e.g., Stroop). As the methods have matured, neuroscientists have begun to study more complex forms of cognition such as discourse comprehension (e.g., Mason & Just, 2006). Educational researchers should wait for these more relevant data to be collected and distilled into succinct theories.

(7) **Control:** *If education cedes control to neuroscience, it will never get it back.* This is perhaps the most insidious concern. Many educational researchers with whom we have spoken view neuroscience as a threat to their discipline. Neuroscience has ascended, both in the popular imagination and in the academy. Images of the brain coupled with material explanations appear to command more authority than the functional explanations of psychology. Within the academy, new neuroscience programs have cannibalized resources from other disciplines. Educational researchers see what is happening in psychology, where theories are increasingly cast in terms of neural mechanisms and debates increasingly turn on imaging data. Educational researchers may anticipate a similar fate if they allow
neuroscience in the door.

(8) Payoffs: Too often in the past, neuroscience findings have turned into neuromyths. Whatever we might hope for a future educational neuroscience, the payoffs thus far have been mainly neuromyths. Bruer’s (1997) article pointed to irresponsible extrapolations of basic neuroscience research on critical periods, environmental enrichment, and synaptogenesis. Much of this research had been conducted on animals using sensory and motor tasks. Bruer pointed out that there is simply too much distance between this research and the questions of education to draw meaningful and defensible implications. He was particularly worried that an undue focus on the learning of preschool children would draw attention away from the remarkable range of knowledge and skills that people acquire throughout their lifetimes. Many other neuromyths exist (e.g., Goswami, 2006). What is common to all is the inflation of basic neuroscience findings of limited scope into educational advice of dubious value.

More alarmingly, neuromyths have escaped beyond academia and are being marketed directly to school administrators and teachers. These commercial programs describe simple physical exercises for “switching on the brain before a lesson,” “increasing information flow between the left and right hemispheres,” and so on. Regardless of the efficacy of these programs, their claims are not founded on what is actually known about brain function. What started as neuromyths have degenerated further into neuromarketing.
Concerns as Opportunities

The eight concerns represent a significant challenge to educational neuroscience. In this section, we cycle through them a second time with the perspective that each also represents an opportunity for new and innovative research.

Revisiting the Scientific Concerns

The four scientific concerns reflect in-principle problems with connecting education and neuroscience. If the divide between the disciplines is fundamentally unbridgeable, then collaborations between educators and neuroscience will ultimately fail. An alternative is that the disciplines are complementary, with many potential synergies.

(1') Methods: Innovative designs can allow neuroscience to study the effects of variables of interest to education. A powerful way to improve education is to design and implement new learning contexts and interactions. Even though the context of a scanner is necessarily spare, fMRI experiments can be used to measure differences in brain activity after students have experienced different contexts. For example, Delazer et al. (2005) compared two ways of learning novel arithmetic operations. In the memorization condition, participants simply associated operands with results. In the strategic condition, they learned an algorithm for transforming operands into results. The instructional parallel would be memorizing math facts versus learning to compute them (e.g., Baroody, 1985).
A subsequent fMRI scan revealed that participants in the memorization condition showed greater activation in a network of brain areas specialized for the retrieval of verbally-coded information (including angular gyrus). Conversely, participants in the strategic condition showed greater activation in a network of brain areas involved in controlled visuospatial processing (including inferior precuneus and anterior cingulate cortex). This suggests the use of spatial working memory to store intermediate results during execution of the algorithm. This study makes the point, obvious to educational researchers, that different learning contexts can cause people to adopt different strategies to solve the same problems. More importantly, it illustrates how neuroscience methods can be used to detect and understand these differences.

Neuroscience also brings new perspectives to the study of development that may be useful to educational research. Rivera et al. (2005) imaged children between the ages of 8 and 19 as they solved simple arithmetic problems. Behaviorally, they found that speed increased with age (though accuracy did not – all children could solve all problems equally well). The neuroimaging data “opened the hood” to reveal that the continuous improvement in speed was not the result of a continuous change in the efficiency with which a particular brain area performed a particular process. Rather, it was the result of a transition from domain-general processing to domain-specific processing. Younger children recruited general memory and reasoning areas (including medial temporal lobe,
basal ganglia, middle frontal gyrus, and anterior cingulate cortex). By contrast, older children used visual and verbal areas (including fusiform gyrus and supramarginal gyrus). A continuous change in behavior belied an important cognitive shift, one that neuroscience methods could detect. This study raises the possibility of designing activities that help children shift from domain-general to domain-specific modes of thought.

Neuroscience methods can also be used to study the effects of cultural variables. For example, Tang et al. (2006) imaged native English- and Chinese-speaking participants as they added and compared Arabic numbers. English participants showed greater activation in language areas (including Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas) whereas Chinese participants showed greater activation in motor areas (including premotor and supplementary areas). The researchers speculated that this is a consequence of the fact that Chinese children are taught arithmetic using the abacus, and appear to retain a visuo-motor understanding of number even as adults. This study raises a number interesting educational questions. For example, children are often introduced to place-value through manipulation of base-10 blocks. When they later reason without manipulatives, do they show residual activation in premotor areas? If so, does this have implications for the sequencing of hands-on and paper-and-pencil lessons?

(2’) Data: Neuroscience data suggest different decompositions of thought, and may therefore imply new kinds of instructional theories. An important goal of
cognitive neuroscience is to understand the neural bases of cognition. In the past, this involved starting with psychological constructs, like working memory, and identifying their neural correlates. Increasingly, however, neuroscience studies are revealing novel decompositions of cognition that are invisible at the behavioral level (Byrnes & Fox, 1998).

For example, adults solve single-digit multiplication problems faster than single-digit subtraction problems (e.g., Campbell & Xue, 2001). One explanation of this difference is that both are performed by retrieving facts from a mental “lookup table.” People may have more experience with multiplication than subtraction, so they are faster at looking up answers. A different explanation, emanating from the neuroscience literature, is that multiplication and subtraction use different strategies implemented by different brain networks (Dehaene et al., 2003). In particular, multiplication recruits a network of brain areas known to be involved in verbal processing (including angular gyrus). This is consistent with retrieval of verbally coded multiplication facts – a fast strategy. By contrast, subtraction recruits a network of brain areas implicated in visuospatial processing (including intraparietal sulcus). This suggests that subtraction requires reasoning about the magnitudes of numbers, a comparatively slower process. The neuroscience explanation of the behavioral difference between multiplication and subtraction – that they are performed using different brain networks that implement different strategies – raises a number of interesting questions. For
example, collaborative research between mathematics education and neuroscience could investigate whether this strategic difference is a consequence of the different ways in which the operations are taught and practiced.

(3’) Theories: Reductionism is appropriate if it is not eliminative.

Reduction is a unifying principle of science: the macroscopic terms of coarse-grain sciences are coordinated with the microscopic terms of fine-grain sciences. This is the time-honored process by which the sciences are stitched together. Partial unification of education and neuroscience, if it comes, should be welcomed. What is problematic is eliminative reductionism (e.g., Churchland, 1989). This is the doctrine that neuroscience explanations should replace – not just anchor or enrich – behavioral explanations (Byrnes & Fox, 1998).

A classic example of reduction is statistical mechanics. Newton formulated classical mechanics in the seventeenth century; Carnot proposed thermodynamics in 1824. Initially, these were considered incommensurable theories belonging to different disciplines. It was not until the late 1800s that Boltzmann, Gibbs, and others formulated statistical mechanics, which reduces thermodynamics to classical mechanics. For example, the thermodynamic notion of temperature reduces to the mechanical notion of mean kinetic energy. However, thermodynamics was not reduced away – chemists, chemical engineers, and others continue to use its more macroscopic terms when appropriate.

Similarly, reducing select educational terms to neuroscience terms will not
eliminate them. Rather, it will make it possible for education to recruit the micro-
description of neuroscience when necessary, and for neuroscience to recruit the
macro-description of education when necessary.

Biology provides a good example of how to maintain levels of analysis
within a reductionist paradigm. It makes a corridor of explanations from
molecular biology all the way up to ecology and zoology. Explanations at lower
levels are consistent with those at higher levels but do not replace them. Rather,
their relationship is complementary and supplementary – witness the existence of
the journals *Molecular Ecology* and *Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B:
Molecular and Developmental Evolution*. One can imagine an analogous corridor
of explanation from neuroscience to education. This proposal is not new. It
originates with Bruer (1997), who observed that even if bridging from education
to neuroscience in a single span proves impossible, a system of smaller bridges
might be possible; for example, from instruction to cognitive psychology, and
from cognitive psychology to cognitive neuroscience.

(*4*) *Philosophy: Neuroscience may help resolve some of the
incommensurables in education.* Pointing to the incommensurables between
education and neuroscience ignores the incommensurables within education itself.

In education, different theoretical constructs are used to study different
dimensions of task performance – cognitive, motivational, emotional, social,
cultural – and the results are published in different journals. Cognition, for
example, is often treated as “what gets a task done,” whereas motivation is treated as “what gets people to try a task.” There is little vocabulary for connecting these two aspects of learning. Neuroscience may help resolve some of the balkanization within education because it provides a common biological vocabulary for describing phenomena, and a common reporting scheme for describing the results of neuroimaging experiments.

One example of how neuroscience can accommodate multiple dimensions of learning is research on the brain’s “reward system” (Montague et al., 2006). The internal reward system is not just responsible for motivating behavior, it also modulates learning. A key to the internal reward system is the neurotransmitter dopamine. Dopamine increases when there is a discrepancy between an expected and a realized external reinforcement (e.g., food, money). For example, if people expect a low payoff and receive a high one (or vice versa), dopamine increases. However, if people expect a high payoff and receive a high payoff, dopamine does not increase. The dopamine system helps to adjust people’s expectations, which is a form of learning. The initial research on dopamine used animals, single-cell recording, and reinforcements such as fruit juice. More recent research on the internal reward system has extended to include social dimensions of human performance. For example, Rilling et al. (2004) used fMRI to study dyads as they played a game that allows for both cooperation and competition. The reinforcement in this case was money. They found that the brain incentivizes
cooperation – greater cooperation was associated with greater activation in the reward system (including striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex).

The reward system is also sensitive to emotional dimensions of performance. For example, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that the more unfair (i.e., emotionally negative) an interaction, the greater the activity of the reward system (specifically the insula). The neuroscience notion of an internal reward system naturally unifies what are typically treated as disparate dimensions within education: motivation, emotion, social factors, and learning. It is an interesting question whether this research can also inform our understanding of how the reward structure of the classroom affects learning. For example, is the dopamine system recruited by purely cognitive feedback (correct versus incorrect) that does not involve any overt external benefit (e.g., Tricomi et al., 2006)?

The place-based reporting scheme of neuroimaging also helps unify the results of different studies even when they address different phenomena. Neuroimaging papers describe the activation peaks from each experiment using standardized brain coordinates. This place-based organization makes it possible to identify the networks of brain areas that consistently co-activate across populations and tasks.³ For instance, single-digit subtraction activates intraparietal sulcus among other brain areas (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2003). Explicit spatial tasks, like mental rotation, also activate this area (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1999). The co-location of function allowed Dehaene et al. to infer that subtraction depends on a
spatially represented mental number line.\textsuperscript{4}

Revisiting the Pragmatic Concerns

In the preceding review of scientific concerns, we found opportunities for new research questions of potential mutual interest. The question is whether educational neuroscience can answer these questions. Earlier, we raised four pragmatic concerns. We revisit them here from a more optimistic vantage.

(5') \textit{Costs: Educationally relevant neuroscience might attract additional research funding to education.} The concern that neuroscience research will reduce the funding available to educational research rests on two assumptions: that education and neuroscience have independent research agendas, and that funding for the two disciplines is jointly fixed. Under these assumptions, the increasing funding for neuroscience would necessarily result in decreasing funding for educational research. This \textit{cannibalization} model is shown in Figure 2. However, there are reasons to question both assumptions.

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Figure 2 about here.

The defining claim of educational neuroscience is that the two disciplines are not independent but interdependent, and that there exist research questions of interest to both communities. If this claim is correct, an alternate model is that a portion of the funding for education and a portion of the funding for neuroscience might be redirected to studies that inform both educational practice and principles of brain function. For example, federal grant proposals that promise social
applications are ranked more highly than those that do not. It stands to reason that neuroscience grant proposals that engage educational issues are more likely to be funded (Geake & Cooper, 2003), and funded through neuroscience sources without cannibalizing educational sources. Under this multidisciplinary sharing model, shown in Figure 2, the overall funding available for educational research would increase (though the funding available for conventional education research decreases).

It is also possible that education and neuroscience might not be locked in a zero-sum funding contest. If collaborations between educational researchers and neuroscientists produce new and innovative research, this will attract additional funding to both disciplines. Under this multidisciplinary synergy model, shown in Figure 2, the current funding level for conventional educational research would remain unchanged, and would be supplemented with funding for new studies that include neuroscience components. If the 1990s were “the decade of the brain,” perhaps the 2010s might be “the decade of educating the brain.”

(6) Timing: There are already signs of success. A number of educational neuroscience projects are already underway. The most mature example comes from early reading skills. The initial research used fMRI to identify differences in the language networks of typically and atypically developing children (e.g., Schlaggar & McCandliss, in press). More recent research is making three important contributions: (a) documenting the impact of particular educational
interventions, (b) extending the initial research to languages besides English, and (c) finding that some differences between typical and atypical development also help explain individual differences within the “normal range.”

A number of neuroscience studies have examined the impact of remediation programs for dyslexia developed by educational researchers (Aylward et al., 2003; Shaywitz et al., 2004; Simos et al., 2002; Temple et al., 2000; Temple et al., 2003). In a representative study, Eden et al. (2004) used fMRI to identify the different brain networks recruited by normal readers and those with dyslexia, shown in the left and middle panels of Figure 3, respectively. The dyslexic readers showed reduced activation in areas (including supramarginal gyrus) that have been implicated in mapping orthography (the shape of words) to phonology (the sound of words). The dyslexic readers were then run through a program that educational researchers had developed for remediating phonological difficulties. Successful remediation was associated with increasing activation in these areas, shown in the right panel of Figure 3. In other words, the brain networks of successfully remediated dyslexic readers came to resemble those of normal readers. This partnership between education and neuroscience is informing our understanding of normal reading development, reading disability, and why some interventions are effective for some individuals. One might argue that the important educational work had already been done – the remediation programs already existed. This misses the benefits of a neuroscience explanation
of why these programs work. For example, the neuroscience explanation is leading to new research that examines the early roots of dyslexia in infants (McCandliss & Wolmetz, 2004).

Another important contribution of neuroscience research on dyslexia is that it is raising interesting new questions, such as whether the nature of the underlying deficit is the same across languages. Paulesu et al. (2001) used fMRI to study differences between normal and dyslexic readers of Italian, French, and English. Although these languages differ in many ways, the nature of the deficit is the same in all three: dyslexic readers show reduced activation in the same brain areas compared to normal readers (including superior temporal gyrus, which is adjacent to the areas where Eden et al. (2004) found reduced activation). The implication – untested to our knowledge – is that similar remediation programs should have similar effects across all three languages. In contrast to these three alphabetic languages, Chinese is a logographic language. Siok et al. (2004) found that normal Chinese readers recruit a network of brain areas (including middle frontal gyrus) consistent with the increased visual attention demands of processing logographic words. Critically, they found that dyslexic Chinese readers showed reduced activation in visual attention areas but not in the areas implicated in dyslexia for alphabetic languages. The hypothesis – again, untested to the best of our knowledge – is that logographic and alphabetic languages will
require different remediation programs. It also raises the intriguing question of whether dyslexics in one language would be normal readers in another.

These lines of research are promising, and many see neuroscience as an important asset in the effort to diagnose and remediate substantial learning difficulties (Kosslyn, REF). But this can lead to a quandary: If neuroscience research can only inform educational questions about atypical brains, and if atypical brains differ categorically from typical brains, then neuroscience research might never inform educational questions about average people. Although it is true that neuroscience insights into education have historically followed from research on atypical brains, it is becoming increasingly possible to observe subtle yet reliable individual differences within the normal range. The critical insight of these studies is that in some cases, what appear to be categorical differences between typically and atypically developing children are better viewed as quantitative differences along a continuum.

Returning to the example of reading, many of the characteristics that differentiate normal and dyslexic readers are turning out to also apply to individual differences among normal readers. Shaywitz et al. (2002) found a relationship between reading ability and brain activation that distinguished between dyslexic and non-impaired children. They found the same relation when examining individual differences within the non-impaired group. A similar continuity is emerging in studies of brain connectivity. Many topics of formal
instruction depend on developing strong connections between brain areas. For example, reading requires connecting the visual areas that discern the shapes of letters to the phonological areas that sound them out. These connections are through long axons that collectively form white matter tracts. Niogi and McCandliss (2006) found white matter tract differences between reading disabled versus non-disabled children. Importantly, differences in white matter tract organization are also correlated with standardized reading scores within the normal range (Beaulieu et al., 2005). These examples illustrate how research on atypical populations can provide a toehold into understanding the functional structure of the brain, and how subsequent research can illuminate the finer gradations of performance present in typically developing children. This work may ultimately inform educational efforts to adapt instruction to individual differences.

(7') Control: Ask not what neuroscience can do for education, but what education can do for neuroscience. The relation between educational researchers and neuroscientists is often viewed with an assumption of asymmetry: Neuroscience can inform education, but education has nothing to offer neuroscience. We believe this assumption is incorrect (cf. McCandliss, Kalchman, et al., 2003). Educational research has produced unique insights into the nature of complex cognition and its development, insights that are potentially of foundational importance to future neuroscience research.
One place where education can take a leading role is in providing
guidance on future neuroscience research into complex forms of cognition. Early
neuroimaging studies focused on simple forms of cognition such as perception
and attention. Current experiments are targeting complex forms of cognition.
Which phenomena will be the subject of future neuroimaging studies? This is a
question that educational researchers are poised to help answer (Byrnes & Fox,

Many years of curriculum development, educational research, and the
wisdom of practice have led to an understanding of learning progressions in
different content areas and how these progressions can go awry. This knowledge
can critically shape future neuroimaging studies of complex cognition. For
example, there are just now appearing fMRI studies of elementary forms of
mathematical reasoning such as enumeration (e.g., Piazza et al., 2002),
comparison (e.g., Pinel et al., 2004), place-value (e.g., Pinel et al., 2001),
arithmetic (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2003), and estimation (e.g., Stanescu-Cosson et
al., 2000). Researchers in mathematics education have been studying these topics
for decades. They understand the underlying competencies, the trajectories along
which the concepts are acquired, the obstacles to their acquisition, and the ways to
route around these obstacles (Baroody & Dowker, 2003; Clements et al., 2004).
Over the next few years, we anticipate that researchers in mathematics education
and neuroscience will begin to collaborate on new studies of the development of
elementary mathematical reasoning and its derailment in dyscalculia (e.g., Butterworth, 2003). This research promises to shape neuroscience as much as it shapes education.

Another likely contribution of education will involve the effort to understand how specific experiences give rise to brain circuitry during development. Important questions where education can contribute include the delineation of typical trajectories of subject-matter learning, the identification of experiences that are most important, and how individual differences influence abilities to form brain circuitry for learning in different content areas. Neuroscience has little groundwork for approaching these questions, whereas educational research already accumulated, and continues to accumulate, a significant empirical base. As researchers begin collaborating across disciplinary line, there is already a large asymmetry of information in favor of educational research.

Returning to the example of dyslexia, the Shaywitz et al. (2004) study was primarily a study of the neural correlates of the impact of an educational intervention pioneered by Benita Blachman (Blachman et al., 2003). Blachman’s intervention was based on over twenty years of educational research on cognitive aspects of reading disabilities and how they can be best addressed through educational practice. Without the benefit of such research, neuroscience studies of reading deficits and their remediation would have been at a significant
disadvantage, and might have wound up recapitulating the same false starts and puzzles that educational researchers worked through twenty years ago. Instead, insights from educational and cognitive research pointed to phonological processing deficits as a primary hypothesis for the brain systems that were atypical in reading disabled children. The educational work also provided paradigms for isolating and quantifying phonological processes, and for providing intervention procedures that drove significant changes in reading development.

More generally, educational neuroscience is coming, with or without the consent of educational researchers. Neuroscience is already encroaching on educational territory with studies of complex cognition and its development. Educational researchers should not shy away from this challenge nor inadvertently withhold their knowledge. Neuroscientists are unlikely to plow through hundreds of education articles. So without collaboration, neuroscientists run the risk of running naïve experiments informed by their personal experiences of how children come to learn content area skills and knowledge.

(8') Payoffs: People like to think in terms of brains and responsible reporting of cumulative results can help them. Neuromyths are problematic. However, their very existence tells us something important: people like to reason about brain function. Perhaps they find it easier to think with mental models of physical systems than with conceptual constructs like schemas, goals, and working memory. Perhaps they find material causality most compelling. Another,
less attractive, possibility is that people feel comfortable abnegating responsibility for atypically developing children by blaming their behavioral problems on faulty wiring. Whatever the explanation, people appear to enjoy reasoning about behavior using models of the brain, however sketchy they may be. The question, then, is how to ensure that their reasoning is valid?

One answer is that we need more “plain text” translations of neuroscience findings that report clusters of studies in accessible ways without trying to sell them. One good example is the 2007 report Understanding the Brain: Toward a New Learning Science published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

A second answer is that inferences from neuroscience data to educational topics are more likely to be valid if they are interpolations, not extrapolations. It is dangerous to generalize too far outside the scope of neuroscience findings to formulate advice about how to teach a particular content area. It is safer to target content areas that have been the subject of many neuroscience studies using a variety of methods, tasks, and populations. The existing literature can then constrain inferences, lessening the likelihood of neuromyths.

As we saw above, reading is an example of a well-studied content area. Neuroscientists worked for years to identify the brain areas that activate in normal readers and, later, the subset of areas that fails to activate in dyslexic readers. These data constrained the choice and evaluation of remediation programs.
Mathematics appears to be approaching the same point. There is currently a large effort to document the neural bases of dyscalculia, the mathematical analog of dyslexia (Butterworth, 2005). There are a number of hypotheses regarding the cause of dyscalculia including reduced working memory (e.g., Geary, 1993), impoverished semantic memory (e.g., Geary et al., 2000), limited subitizing (e.g., Koontz & Berch, 1996), impaired numerical reasoning (e.g., Landerl et al., 2004), and a lack of focus on mathematically meaningful properties (Hannula, 2005). fMRI studies are just beginning to identify the neural bases of dyscalculia by contrasting normal versus dyscalculic groups (e.g., Kucian et al., 2006). This effort, in conjunction with studies of the effects of learning interventions, is likely to avoid neuromyths because it is constrained by a large and growing literature. By contrast, neuroscientists are just beginning to understand the neural bases of scientific reasoning (e.g., Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005). To derive recommendations for science education from these initial studies would require extrapolation, and therefore runs the risk of resulting in neuromyths.

Conclusion

This paper has consolidated a number of thoughts-in-the-air about the perils and prospects for educational neuroscience, and solidified them with examples that illustrate some of the ways in which neuroscience goes about its work. We first presented eight concerns with current attempts to connect education and neuroscience. They came in two classes. There were four scientific
concerns about the commensurability of the methods, data, and theories of the two disciplines. Even if these can be surmounted in principle, the four pragmatic concerns suggest that doing so will be difficult in practice. We next revisited the eight concerns, this time finding examples from the neuroscience literature that indicate the potential for complementary research agendas. We argued that though the concerns represent a challenge to educational neuroscience, they also represent an opportunity for innovative new research.

Ultimately, the value of educational neuroscience is an empirical question. For those who believe this question worth engaging, we offer two reflections on taking action. The first is that bridging the divide that separates the education and neuroscience disciplines requires bridging the divide that separates the education and neuroscience communities. The second reflection is to remain cautious in our optimism. There will be limitations on how much education and neuroscience can inform each other, and we must be vigilant, even if we do not yet know what these limitations are.

*Improving Communication between Educational Researchers and Neuroscientists*

The divide between the disciplines of education and neuroscience is also a divide between their respective research communities. Neuroscientists take simple behaviors (e.g., comparing two numbers to determine which is greater) and try to understand them in terms of even simpler processes (e.g., linking number symbols to magnitudes) and their neural implementation. This can frustrate educational
researchers, who may regard such simple behaviors as vanishingly small pieces of a much larger puzzle. They wonder how these tidbits can inform broader questions, such as motivating and enculturating children into important symbol systems. In turn, educational questions can befuddle neuroscientists, who view controlling “nuisance” factors as a prerequisite to asking questions that are informative about basic mechanisms. We see two strategies for improving communication between the education and neuroscience communities.

**Domains, not disciplines.** One strategy is to stop putting forward our disciplines as the way in which we identify ourselves, and instead to put forward the problems we study. Problems can serve as neutral ground, and if they are amenable, they can anchor intellectual exchange. If one’s goal is to conduct research within mathematics education, for example, then it is natural to defend one’s discipline against incursions by neuroscientists and other outsiders. However, if one’s goal is to understand the development of multiplicative reasoning, then many disciplines potentially offer fruitful insights: mathematics education, to be sure, but also the history of mathematics, developmental and cognitive psychology, ethnography, neuroscience, and so on. When researchers identify themselves by the problems they study, then it is valuable to travel to foreign disciplines in search of new insights and to bring back souvenirs – new methods, data, and theories for answering the questions of one’s native discipline.

**Collaboration, not competition.** Another strategy is for educational
researchers and neuroscientists to view themselves as collaborators, not competitors, in the pursuit of knowledge. This requires a commitment to working together. Genuine collaboration is more than parallel play or handing off results to each other in assembly-line fashion. It is a mistake for educational researchers to think that neuroscientists will want to run neuroimaging studies for them, just as it is a mistake for neuroscientists to think that educational researchers will want to collect baseline data on how children perform tasks of minimal ecological validity. It is critically important to formulate questions of empirical and theoretical importance for both communities, yet have the prospect of generating corridors of explanation that neither discipline could traverse alone.

For example, during his post-doctoral training, one of the authors (BDM), who had studied the neuroscience of attention and brain plasticity in learning, collaborated with Isabel Beck, an expert in reading education. They found common ground through a set of reading curriculum materials Beck had developed throughout her career (Beck & Hamilton, 1996). Working as a team on the hypothesis that this approach helped children focus attention on the specific connections between letter and sound combinations at all positions within written words, they created a software program The Reading Works. The work developed implications useful to each discipline in their own terms while building a potential corridor of explanation jointly constructed across education and neuroscience. For examples, an efficacy study for use of this program by children with reading
disabilities employed both cognitive and standardized psycho-educational measures of success (McCandliss, Beck, et al., 2003). The software was then studied as a tool for remediating a connectionist model of developmental dyslexia, providing a novel mechanistic explanation of why the intervention might work where other approaches may fail (Harm et al., 2003). Currently this program is being implemented in a joint school-based randomized control trials of poorly performing urban public elementary school children (versus practice as usual tutoring), combined with a before-after neuroimaging study to test whether its effectiveness is linked to changes in activation patterns across brain regions engaged in phonological and visual processes during decoding (McCandliss, 2007).

_Cautious Optimism_

We agree with other commentators (Ansari & Coch, 2006; Byrnes & Fox, 1998; Geake & Cooper, 2003; Goswami, 2006; Petitto & Dunbar, in press) that there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of educational neuroscience. However, there are also reasons to be cautious about how much the two disciplines can inform each other, and how quickly insights will come.

One reason to be cautious is that the scope of educational neuroscience is as yet unclear. It is still in its infancy, and we do not know its limits. One reviewer of an earlier version of this manuscript asked us to draw a hard line between the disciplines, indicating which aspects of education should remain untouched by
neuroscience – with the implication that these aspects should also retain protected funding. We are not willing to do this. There are obviously educational questions that are far removed from neuroscience, such as policy decisions on drawing district boundaries, but at a theoretical level, it seems premature to say that one line of research could never have relevance for another. Multidisciplinary research efforts often spawn new explanatory tools that dissolve old theoretical boundaries. We are unwilling to speculate about the limitations of educational neuroscience on the basis of current theoretical divisions, for example, between cultural and psychological approaches to learning.

Nevertheless, we have seen that neuroscience treats motivational, cognitive, social, and emotional dimensions of learning as integral (Montague et al., 2006). We have seen that neuroscience research sheds light on cross-cultural differences in reading and mathematical reasoning (Siok et al., 2004; Tang et al., 2006). Looking to the future, studies of the neural correlates of experiencing violence in video games are beginning to appear (e.g., Weber et al., 2006). As these examples suggest, the ultimate scope of educational neuroscience is an empirical question.

Another reason to be cautious about educational neuroscience is that launching multidisciplinary research is difficult, regardless of the disciplines involved. Educating (and learning from) one’s colleagues about the insights and methods of a remote discipline requires commitment. In our experience, it takes at
least a year of sustained interaction before this process begins to generate 
tractable research questions of genuine interest to all involved. A joint multi-year 
grant is one way to sustain this process during the initial stages; working in a 
multidisciplinary center is another. In any case, it is important to ask repeatedly, 
“Would this finding be interesting to you?” and “Why is that finding interesting to 
you?” 

The payoffs of educational neuroscience will likely be modest for the first 
generation of collaborators. Senior researchers have the security to foster inter- 
disciplinary work, but they do not have the time (nor perhaps the will power) to 
earn the equivalent of a second Ph.D and to make a name for themselves in a new 
field. The bigger payoffs likely await the next generation of scholars who will be 
intrigued by the small successes of the next few years and will go on to develop 
truly multidisciplinary identities and research programs that bridge from brain to 
behavior to the problems of education. 

We end with a final reminder that education is not neuroscience and that 
neuroscience is not education. Each discipline addresses a broad range of research 
questions using a variety of methods. The challenge is to identify the questions 
and methods that overlap the most. Currently, neuroscience has little to say about 
the social construction of inequity, and education has little to say about the 
hemodynamic response function. Educational neuroscience will have to mind 
these and other gaps – but it need not be defined by them.
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Footnotes

1 Researchers have recently developed protocols for running children that involve familiarization in a mock scanner. As children watch DVDs or play games, they are slowly acclimated to the environment of the scanner and its requirements for effective measurement. These protocols are helpful, although there is still a high rate of data loss.

2 This identification process is supported by electronic databases such as BrainMap (Laird et al., 2005) and statistical tools such as meta-analysis (e.g., Turkeltaub et al., 2002).

3 One caveat is order here. Neurons aggregate into functional circuits at a spatial level of organization smaller than the resolution of fMRI. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that just because two tasks activate the same brain area, that the same populations of neurons, and therefore the same functional circuitry, is being recruited. However, overlapping patterns of brain activation provide an entry point to start to investigate the potential of shared function, and there are emerging methods for resolving this kind of ambiguity, such as fMRI-adaptation (e.g., Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001).

4 In this regard, it is important to realize that neuroscience is a much larger academic discipline than education: In 2007, approximately 32,000 people attended the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, whereas approximately 16,000 people attended the annual meeting of American
Table 1

Summary of the Concerns and Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Methods Neuroscience methods do not provide access to important</td>
<td>Innovative designs can allow neuroscience to study the effects of context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educational considerations such as context.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Data Localizing different aspects of cognition to different brain</td>
<td>Neuroscience data suggest different decompositions of cognition, and may therefore imply new kinds of instructional theories.</td>
</tr>
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<td>networks does not inform educational practice.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Theories Reductionism is inappropriate.</td>
<td>Reductionism is appropriate if it is not eliminative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Philosophy Education and neuroscience are incommensurable.</td>
<td>Neuroscience may help resolve incommensurables within education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Costs Neuroscience methods are too expensive to address educational</td>
<td>Educationally relevant neuroscience might attract additional research funding to education.</td>
</tr>
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<td>research questions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Timing We do not currently know enough about the brain to inform</td>
<td>There are already signs of success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Control If education cedes control to neuroscience, it will never</td>
<td>Ask not what neuroscience can do for education, but what education can do for neuroscience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get it back.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Payoffs Too often in the past, neuroscience findings have turned</td>
<td>People like to think in terms of brains and responsible reporting of cumulative results can help them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>into neuromyths.</td>
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Figure Captions

*Figure 1.* Growth of the fMRI literature over the past decade. The results were obtained from NIH’s PubMed database (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/) on May 9, 2007 using the following query: fMRI OR "functional MR" OR "functional MRI" OR "functional magnetic resonance imaging". Only empirical studies of human participants were counted.

*Figure 2.* Possible funding models for educational neuroscience. The total funding for educational research decreases under the cannibalization model, remains constant under the multidisciplinary sharing model, and increases under the multidisciplinary synergy model.

*Figure 3.* Remediation of dyslexia at the level of brain function. (left) Left-hemisphere areas active in normal readers. (middle) Before remediation, dyslexic readers show reduced activation in supramarginal gyrus. (right) Remediation results in increased recruitment of this and other areas. *Note.* The images are from Figures 1 and 3 of “Neural changes following remediation in adult developmental dyslexia,” by G. F. Eden et al., 2004, *Neuron, 44*, p. 411-422. Copyright 2004 by Cell Press. Adapted with permission.
Current Funding

Cannibalization

Multidisciplinary Sharing

Multidisciplinary Synergy

education neuroscience

educational neuroscience